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Abstract— A major concern in distributed networks is the 
ability to provide acceptable levels of security. This is achieved by 
using encryption and authentication mechanisms that depend on 
encryption keys. However, given the ever-expanding nature of 
the network, it is difficult to keep setting up authorities that can 
aid the key-exchange process. This paper presents a novel 
solution to the challenge of exchanging keys of a large, 
distributed network without the need to set up additional 
authorities. The key-exchange scheme presented takes advantage 
of features such as packet anonymity, random selection and a 
multi-path approach for the exchange process. The paper also 
discusses the effectiveness of the proposed scheme against various 
threat scenarios. 
Keywords—Key Distribution; Secret Key; multipath anonymous 
randomized key distribution, pairwise key exchange 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As distributed networks are decentralized, they require a 
robust scheme to preserve the security of the devices connected 
to them. In the last decade, an increasing number of devices has 
become a part of such networks and the trend is still growing. 
One of the main reasons for their increased popularity is the 
fact that they can be set up anywhere with minimal 
infrastructure requirements. However, with an increase in 
unattended standalone networks in adversarial environments, 
the need for improved security is very high [1, 4]. In this paper, 
we present a new key-distribution scheme, specifically 
designed for distributed networks. 
Although the security of such networks is easily improved 
using end-to-end encryption, the most crucial component of the 
process is the key exchange as it provides the key to be used 
for encryption/decryption process. The key-exchange can be 
attempted using various schemes; each one with its own set of 
keying style [7] as depicted in Table I. The approach to be used 
for a specific network is determined after analyzing the various 
components and configuration of that distributed network. 
The encryption/decryption process can be conducted using 
a symmetric key where a master key is distributed throughout 
the network. However, if even one of the devices in the 
network is compromised, it will compromise the whole 
network [2]. To avoid this, individual asymmetric or public-
private key pairs are preferred as the public key can only be 
used to encrypt and only its linked private key can decrypt. 
This way even if a device is compromised, it would not be able 
to compromise the whole network. 
 
These keys (or keying material) can be pre-loaded onto the 
devices (key pre-distribution) and used when connecting to the 
network. This approach is however very static and can disrupt 
the network by compromising enough devices to be able to 
compromise other keys being distributed [3]. To avoid such 
scenarios, dynamic key-pairs are used and can be updated 
regularly to maintain a higher level of security [5, 6]. In 
addition to the approach and keying style, there are certain 
constraints, which need to be considered when designing a key 
distribution scheme for distributed networks [8].  
The devices that form a distributed network can span over 
very large areas and hence communicate using the concept of 
hopping. This implies that any data sent over the network will 
travel through other devices before finally reaching its 
destination. The distributed networks also contain mobile 
nodes that keep changing locations, and in doing so, also 
change the network layout [10]. A major factor on which the 
key strength and size depend is the computational resources 
available with the devices in the networks [9]. 
To address the above concerns and constraints, we present 
out proposed Multi-Path Anonymous Randomized Key 
distribution scheme. Section II discusses the assumptions made 
regarding the applicable network structure and provides the 
notations used in this article. The paper then presents the Multi-
Path Anonymous Randomized Key (MPARK) distribution 
scheme and its components in Section III. In Section IV, we 
expand upon the various security threats and show how they 
are overcome using our scheme. Finally, we conclude our 
proposed scheme as well as discuss its future development in 
Section V. 
TABLE I.  TYPES OF KEY DISTRIBUTION APPROACHES 
Approach Mechanism Keying Style 




Pre – Distribution 
Pair-Wise key 
Combinatorial 





Pre – Distribution Combinatorial 
Dynamic Key Generation 
Key Matrix 
Polynomial 
II. RELATED STUDIES AND MOTIVATION 
The network uses different types of crypto keys to perform 
encryption and can also be used for authentication purposes. 
Hence, the crypto keys play an important part in the security 
framework by strengthening other components of the 
framework. Key management techniques for any network can 
be divided into two main components: the key generation 
process and the key distribution process. These two processes 
work independently of each other but contribute equally to the 
strength of the network.   
Key Generation: The key generation process is designated 
to create the crypto keys that will be used by the device for 
encryption and in certain cases authentication. The crypto keys 
can be generated using various techniques depending upon the 
requirement. As the crypto keys are of two types, symmetric 
(secret) or asymmetric (public-private), the technique used 
must be selected accordingly. For each secret key or public-
private key pair generated, there are certain factors that govern 
the strength provided by the keys when in operation. These 
factors include the followings. 
Seed Value: The seed value in an initial string of characters 
is used to create the key. The randomness of the characters in a 
seed value determines the strength of the key. This randomness 
can be true randomness captured from a source such as the 
clicks from a Geiger Counter [12], using the voice or thermal 
noise captured by sound equipment [13] or using a light source. 
The randomness can also be generated using pseudorandom 
sources that use certain algorithms to generate almost random 
numbers. Although true random sources and considered better 
than pseudorandom sources, the random sources have, at any 
given time, collected only a finite set of available characters as 
compared to the infinite number of characters that a 
pseudorandom generator can provide anytime.  
Key Length: The length of the key is also considered 
important as it defines the number of characters available to the 
encryption mechanism to use for encryption. The more 
characters a key has, the greater its length and the greater the 
time it would take to guess the combination. This is because 
the number of possible combinations increases exponentially 
with the increase in several characters used as well as the type 
of characters used. For example, a 2-character binary-based 
key will have 4 possible combinations as compared to a 10-
character integer-based key that can have 10,000,000,000 
possible combinations, thus, increasing the complexity and 
thereby utilizing more time to calculate. 
Key Distribution: The key distribution process involves 
the exchange of newly generated crypto keys amongst devices 
and any possible central entities on the network. The key 
exchange is a crucial stage as any compromise or tampering 
with the keys can sabotage the other components of the 
security framework. The key exchange involves setting up a 
communication channel with a device or central entity in order 
to send the crypto key. The type of key being exchanged 
defines the type of security required for the transmission 
channel. A secret key requires a secure connection or a trusted 
party connection to be exchanged safely as it can be used for 
both the encryption and decryption process, whereas a public-
private key pair can use an open channel as only the public key 
needs to be exchanged which can only be used to encrypt the 
data. Various existing schemes present different ways of 
achieving the same [14, 15] using a certification authority 
responsible for storing and distributing keys, hierarchical based 
key distribution schemes, one-way tree-based distribution, 
multi-key distribution, among others. 
  
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS 
This section states some realistic assumptions for the 
distributed network scenario where our proposed key 
distribution scheme MPARK can be applied. This section also 
defines the notations used while defining the proposed scheme. 
A. Network Assumptions. 
The MPARK distribution scheme considers some realistic 
assumptions to maintain an adequate level of security. As it is 
an integral part of a network, there must exist a central entity 
referred to as a server. The server must be able to keep a record 
of all the public keys in use and the devices they are linked to. 
The server must also have enough processing power to conduct 
complex calculations and fast storage to traverse and lookup 
data quickly. The server must always be run and maintained as 
an active connection to the network devices directly or through 
proxy devices.  
Another integral part of a distributed network is the devices 
it is formed of; hence it is important that all the devices have 
adequate resources. The devices must have enough processing 
power to be able to generate their own asymmetric key pairs 
(used in key exchange) and symmetric key (used as a session 
key). In addition to adequate processing power, they must also 
contain enough memory to store a few megabytes of data such 
as the key pool and keying material. 
A new device that is connecting or seeking a connection to 
the network must be authenticated before the key exchange is 
initiated. Until the authentication process is completed, the new 
device must not be given full or partial access to the network. 
In order to maintain the integrity of the proposed scheme, it is 
also important that the new device is within range of two or 
more edge devices (a device which is already a part of the 
network) before the key exchange is initiated. 
B. Notations used 
Table II. lists the various notations used, the component 
they refer to and their descriptions. These notations are used to 
refer to integral components of the proposed scheme. 
IV. PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
This section presents the proposed MPARK distribution 
scheme to address the issues stated in the above section. The 
aim is to use anonymity and randomness to further reduce the 
risks involved in the key exchange over an insecure wireless 
channel in distributed systems. This section discusses the 
working of the MPARK distribution scheme, its components, 
the details of the methodology used and its effectiveness. 
The proposed scheme has been divided into its major 
components to provide its key details. Each component 
provides its unique features and when combined all together, 
form a strong key distribution scheme. The major components 
are individually discussed below. 
 
TABLE II.  LIST OF NOTATIONS USED. 
Notations Component  Description 
DN New Device 
A new user device that is attempting a key 
exchange. 
DE Edge Device 
A user device which is currently part of the 
network and has an existent key pair set up 
with the server 
Server Central Server 
A centralized system used to keep a record 
of public keys and the devices they 
correspond to. A user device can use it to 
look up the public key for another device it 
wishes to contact. 
KPU Public Key 
A unique key linked to a user device’s 
private key. It is publicly stored on the server 
and can be used by any device only to 
encrypt data destined for its user device 
KPI Private Key 
A unique secret key stored securely on the 
user device. Only a specific private key can 
be used to decrypt data that was encrypted 
with its linked public key. 
KP Key Pair 
A set of Private Key and Public Key that are 
linked to each other. 
Pkt Data Packet 
A normal TCP/IP packet used to encapsulate 
data and other important information while it 
travels from the source device to the 
destination device. 
TTL Time To Live 
A time value which represents the validity of 
the data packet. If the time to live is expired, 




An active connection refers to an ongoing 
connection between a device and its in-range 
neighbor device. 




A random starting variable used as an 
initializer for the encryption process. 
NP Number of KP 
The total number of key pairs created during 
a single key distribution process 
NE Number of DE 
The number of edge devices involved in the 
Key Distribution process. 
NS A set of KP 
The set of Key Pairs (Can also refer to Public 
Keys in general) that are part of a single set 
of Keys packed in a data packet 
Rnd Randomizer 
An absolute (or pseudo) randomness 
generator 
SV Seed Value 
The initial elements used as a reference when 
creating key pairs. 
A. Initial contact 
The initial contact can be defined as the moment a new 
device is being added or has requested to be added to the 
network. During this phase, the new device undergoes the 
authentication process. The steps involved in the authentication 
process will vary depending upon the type of network being 
addressed and the various constraints it uses. In either scenario, 
the authentication must be completed successfully before a 
device is provided access to the network.  
Only after the authentication process is successfully 
completed, the new device is provided with a public key KPU 
(Fig. 2) to communicate with the network server using a secure 
line. Before the key-pairs KP are generated, the new device also 
calculates a list of possible edge nodes that can be used to 
initiate the key exchange process. This list of edge devices NE 
is used while generating encryption keys and is defined further 
in the next section. 
B. Key-Pair generation 
The key generation process is usually an integral part of the 
scheme as the strength of the key is directly related to the 
amount of time it will take to break it. It also depends upon the 
type of devices being used in the network as the key length will 
be selected based on the computation possible with onboard 
resources. As in a distributed network, the data travels using 
hops, the size of the encrypted data is also an important factor 
when selecting an encryption algorithm [11].  
Our scheme uses asymmetric keys, so only the public key 
KPU is exchanged, which is unique for each device on the 
network. In addition, as the key pair KP is generated by the 
device itself, the private key KPI never leaves the host device 
and hence an adversary cannot predict the private key. 
However, unlike other key distribution schemes, which 
generate a single key-pair, our proposed scheme generates a 
pool of key-pairs KPOOL.  
This pool of key-pairs KPOOL decreases the probability of 
finding the actual key, which is randomly selected from the 
pool by the server, amongst the rest of the dummy keys. Each 
key pair KP generated uses a different version of the seed value 
SV to avoid similarity in the generated pairs and will provide 
the same level of encryption. All key-pairs KP are regarded the 
same until the server picks one (the chosen key pair for the 
device) making the rest into dummy keys. 
The number of keys generated, KPOOL, is directly 
proportional to the number of reachable edge devices NE. As 
the key pool is divided amongst the available edge devices, DE, 
for increased randomness, more key-pairs are generated if 
more edge devices are in range. Each edge node is given a 
subset of the pool of keys NS generated to send to the server. 
The number of keys also varies based on the maximum size 
of data that each packet can contain as well as the key length. 
On average, 50 key-pairs are generated for each available edge 
device and only the public keys are sent out in sets.  
C. Key Transmission 
The scheme takes advantage of the availability of multiple 
nodes/points of connectivity to the network. Instead of sending 
all the keys through one point of contact, sub-sets of the key 
pool (key-set) NS are created and distributed amongst the 
reachable nodes DE (Fig. 1), thus further increasing the 
anonymity in the key exchange process. 
The key set can be transmitted in both the static network by 
using a routing table with predefined paths, and the dynamic 
network by using a greedy algorithm and dynamically selecting 
the next-hop nodes). The transmission’s anonymity will be less 
for a predefined path as compared to that of a dynamic one, but 
both will provide adequate anonymity to increase the overall 
security of the scheme.  
Moreover, it provides additional protection against 
malicious nodes as the key pool is divided amongst the 
available edge nodes. This prevents the malicious node from 
getting hold of all possible keys. In addition to multiple paths, 
the packets carrying the keys are encrypted and looked like any 
normal data packet to make it harder to trace it across the 
network. 
D. Key Selection 
As the different sets of keys reach the server through 
different paths, it is important to know when they will expire. 
Hence, every set of keys sent across has a timeout value preset 
in it (TTL). The server will check this value when it receives 
the packet and will accordingly discard any packet whose TTL 
has expired. 
The server will then randomly select a public key KPU from 
the collective pool of all the keys received within the TTL. 
This key will then be registered as the communication key for 
the new device and can be requested by any device in the 
network to securely communicate with the new device. 
In order to maintain two-way encryption, the server will 
also share a public key from its own pool using which the new 
device can contact the server. The server uses multiple key 
pairs for enabling devices on the network to communicate with 
it. The server, however, does not generate a unique key for 
each device, instead, it uses a key for a group of a predefined 
number of devices. Once the server’s most recent public key is 
distributed to the pre-set number of devices, it creates a new 
key pair and will start allocating it to another set of new 
devices. 
E. Challenge-Response 
The server, upon having selected a public key, will send the 
new node a mathematical challenge. This is achieved by 
creating a moderately complex mathematical question which is 
then encrypted (along with the server’s own public key) using 
the new device’s selected public key. By doing so, the server 
can assure the new device knows which public key has been 
chosen.  
The new device upon receiving the challenge decrypts it 
with its pool of private keys. Once the new device can decrypt 
the challenge it knows which public key has been selected by 
the server and linked to the new device. It will then solve the 
challenge and encrypt the answer using the server provided 
public key. This is then sent over to the server for confirmation 
that the new device knows the selected key and is now ready to 
become a part of the network. 
V. KEY DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
This section discusses the methodology involved in the key 
distribution process. The process has been divided into various 
steps outlined by the MPARK distribution scheme; see Table II 
for details regarding the notations used in this section. 
Once DN is authenticated, it will establish an open line 
connection to any DE in range. The connection at present is 
defined as an open line because no keys have been exchanged 
to enable encryption. 
 DN (CON) → DE ∈ NE (1) 
All the DE will provide DN with Server (KPU). As the server 
maintains a set of KPU’s, individual DE may possess different 
KPU (Server), which they use to communicate with the server. 
 Server (KPU): DE → DN (2) 
DN will calculate the number of CON it has with DE (NE), 
based on which it will calculate the size of KPOOL to be used. 
The size of KPOOL depends upon the number of CON with DE. 
A single Pkt will be sent to each DE containing NS of KPU. 
  CON (DE) → NE (3) 
 NS = NE (4) 
DN will use random data for the SV value to create a set of 
NP KP. 
 Rnd (SV) → DN (KPU ∪ KPI) (5) 
 NP: (DN (KPU ∪ KPI)) = NP: DN (KP) (6) 
 NP: DN (KP) = KPOOL (7) 
The generated KPU will be divided into NE sets and 
individually encrypted with the server KPU provided by each 
DE. 
 NE Server (KPU) → NS DN (KPU) = NS (Pkt) (8) 
The encrypted NS will be converted into packets and will be 
given a TTL value. Then they will be distributed to the DE 
corresponding to the server KPU they provided.  
 TTL ∪ NS (Pkt) = Pkt (NE) (9) 
 Pkt (NE) → DE (NE) (10) 
Once DE receives the encrypted Pkt, it will be sent across 
the network to the server. Each Pkt may take different time and 
a different path to reach the server. 
 Pkt (DN): DE → Server (11) 
The server will collect the Pkt’s with a valid TTL; any late 
Pkt will be discarded. The server will then decrypt the received 
Pkt with its KPI linked to the respective KPU used to encrypt the 
Pkt. 
 Server (KPI) → Pkt (DN) = NS DN (KPU) (12) 
 
Fig. 1. Multi-Path data transmission 
 
Fig. 2. MPARK distribution at a glance 
Once all the NS (DN) that made it to the server have been 
collected and decrypted, the server will then use a Rnd to select 
a single DN (KPU) from the NS. 
 Rnd: NS DN (KPU) → DN (KPU) (13) 
Once a KPU is selected, the Server will then prepare a 
mathematical challenge for DN. The Server will encrypt this 
Mathematical challenge with the DN (KPU) it has selected. It 
will also include the Server (KPU) for DN to respond using a 
secure channel. 
 DN (KPU): (4 * 8) ∪ Server (KPU) → Pkt (Server) (14) 
The server will then send the challenge over to DN for 
confirmation of DN (KPU) selection and verification. 
 Pkt (Server) → DN (15) 
Once DN receives the Pkt from the Server, it will start the 
process of decrypting it using its KPOOL of KPI. In doing so, DN 
will find out which KP has been selected by the server.  
 KPOOL DN (KPI) ∪ Pkt (Server) → DN (KP) (16) 
 DN (KP) → DN (KPI ∪ KPU) (17) 
As DN now knows the KP chosen, it will use the KPI to 
decrypt the Pkt received from the server to obtain the 
challenge. In addition, it will also get the KPU of the server. 
 DN (KPI) → Pkt (Server) → (4 * 8) ∪ Server (KPU) (18) 
The DN will then solve the challenge and as before, it will 
encrypt the answer using Server (KPU) it just received. DN will 
also include its KPU to confirm its selection. 
 (4 * 8) = 32 (19) 
 Server (KPU) → ((32) ∪ DN (KPU)) → Pkt (DN) (20) 
DN will now send the Pkt to the server and finish the key 
exchange process from its end. 
 Pkt (DN) → Server (21) 
Once it receives the Pkt, the Server will use its KPI linked to 
the KPU provided to DN to decrypt the Pkt. 
 Server (KPI) → Pkt (DN) = (32) ∪ DN (KPU) (22) 
The Server will check the answer received and, in addition, 
if the KPU received is the same one that was provided to DN 
then the Server will finish the key exchange process. 
 (32) = (4 * 8) → True (23) 
 Server (DN (KPU)) = DN (DN (KPU)) → True (24) 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we discuss the claims brought forward by 
the proposed MPARK distribution scheme and their proof. We 
will also analyze the strength of our proposed scheme against 
known security threats relevant to distributed networks. 
A. Validation  
The proposed key distribution scheme makes the following 
claims: 
Claim 1: The proposed scheme introduces a multi-key 
approach making it computationally complex for the intruder to 
discover the communication key being used. 
Proof: According to the MPARK distribution scheme, a 
new device must create a pool of keys amongst which one of 
the keys is selected by the server as the communication key for 
the new device. As all the keys generated have identical 
strength and are of the same length, it is computationally 
complex to determine which one would be selected as the 
communication key for the new device.  
 P1 (Key Discovery) = 1 / KPOOL (25) 
As we can see from the equation above, the probability P1 
of a key being found is inversely proportional to the number of 
keys generated as defined by the size of KPOOL. 
Claim 2: The proposed scheme incorporates a multi-path 
approach to distribute keys to avoid potential internal threats. 
Proof: In addition to using a pool of keys, public keys are 
organized into a set of keys, which are then sent across the 
network to the server with the help of multiple edge devices. 
Each edge node uses a different path to transmit the key set. 
The use of these organized set of public keys ensures the 
server at least has a sub-set of the KPOOL to pick a key from. 
The number of keys in each set is determined by the number of 
edge devices in range of the new device. 
 NS = KPOOL / NE (26) 
 P2 (Key Discovery | P1) = P1 / NS (27) 
By distributing the generated keys into multiple devices, 
the probability P2 of key discovery is further reduced based on 
the number of edge devices available. As seen in the equation 
above, P2 is further reduced when P1 is added to the equation. 
In addition, if the nature of the path is dynamic, we can 
consider additional randomness at each hop taken by each set 
of keys as an additional improvement over P2. 
Claim 3: By incorporating anonymity in the key exchange 
process the proposed scheme ensures data packet 
confidentiality by concealing source information.  
Proof: The data packets used in the MPARK distribution 
scheme are disguised as normal data packets. In addition to the 
disguise, the source information of the packet is retracted from 
the header and is replaced by the last hop information. The 
source information is added to the encrypted part of the 
message. This information is only intended for the server 
because only the server will be able to decrypt the packet. 
 This ensures that while the packet travels through the 
network, its source and data cannot be identified or tracked 
providing anonymity. 
Claim 4: Use of challenge-response in the proposed 
scheme makes it computationally improbable to tamper 
selected key. 
Proof: According to the MPARK distribution scheme, once 
the server has selected a key, it does not relay it back to the 
new device, but instead uses a challenge-response. As the new 
device possesses all the private keys, the server creates a 
mathematical challenge, encrypts it with the selected key and 
sends it to the new device. 
By using a challenge-response, the selected key does not 
need to transmit back, just the encrypted message. As only the 
new device can decrypt the message using its pool of private 
keys, it will know which public key was used by the server to 
encrypt the packet. It can then send the solution to the 
challenge provided by the server confirming the new device 
now knows which public key was selected and thereby ending 
the key exchange. 
B. Threat analysis 
As devices in a distributed network are not usually 
monitored, there are various types of attacks, some affect their 
vicinity whereas others may affect the whole network [12,13]. 
Here, we discuss major security threats in key distribution and 
how MPARK distribution scheme validates against them. 
Rogue / Compromised Network Device: In the event of a 
network device being compromised or going rogue, there is the 
very certain risk of the network becoming unstable. The major 
risk is the use of symmetric keys or the same set of asymmetric 
keys for the entire network. The rogue/compromised device 
will have the capability to intercept and disrupt any exchange 
on the network whether it is an open line or encrypted. 
In our scheme, if a device (or multiple devices) is 
compromised, it would not affect the network. As described in 
Section III.A, each device uses its unique key-pair to 
communicate with other devices and the server. In addition, 
only the public keys are ever distributed, and the private key 
never leaves the host device; ensuring that only the host device 
can decrypt the data destined for it. 
 (Distributed) Denial of Service Attack: A DOS or DDOS 
attack may not have that much impact on network devices as 
overcrowding a device would just result in the data taking a 
different and less congested path. A DOS / DDOS attack on the 
server can result in relative delays in the network by slowing 
down the requests. However, this can be overcome by the 
server using a detection system as it already has enough power 
and resources to run it. It can also be resolved if the multiple 
synced servers are used to balance the request loads. 
Rogue Edge Device: In the scenario that the edge devices 
involved in the authentication process turns out to be a rogue 
device, the key exchange may be compromised or tampered 
with. The MPARK distribution scheme uses multiple edge 
devices to initiate the key exchange process, as described in 
Section III.C, to make sure that a subset of all the keys 
generated is successfully transferred to the server through other 
edge devices. In addition, the pool of keys being sent is 
encrypted with different server public keys making it highly 
improbable for the rogue edge device to decrypt it. 
Acknowledgment spoofing: A compromised device can 
disrupt an ongoing key exchange with the server by sending a 
spoofed acknowledgment message to the device or even the 
server. This attack can be used in addition to other attacks to 
avoid the attack being detected by neighbor devices or the 
server. This is avoided using a mathematical challenge that can 
only be solved by the device whose public key was used to 
encrypt the challenge in the first place. As described in Section 
III.E, the MPARK distribution scheme uses a mathematical 
challenge to acknowledge the receipt and selection of the 
public key for the new node, thereby avoiding any spoofed 
acknowledgment. 
Man In The Middle Attack (MITM): A MITM attack 
during the key distribution process is a major threat. It can 
result in tampering of the key, impersonation and even identity 
theft causing a major network failure. This is achieved by using 
a combination of randomness in the key transmission and 
selection process along with the anonymity achieved by 
disguising packets and the use of dummy keys.  
When combined, the multipath approach, random key 
generation and selection, anonymous key transmission, 
mathematical challenge and the use of dummy keys 
significantly decrease the probability of the selected key being 
tampered with. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The key distribution scheme is a vital component of the 
security framework of any distributed network. In this paper, 
we proposed a new key distribution scheme designed for 
distributed networks. Its major components were discussed in 
detail along with the methodology and then analyzed based on 
various threats. The proposed MPARK distribution scheme 
provides a unique combination of randomness, anonymity and 
multi-path approach which can prevent well-known threats by 
minimizing the probability of compromise during the key 
exchange process.  
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